Increscitur in Personal Injury Cases by Mathews, Frank E.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 2 
January 1930 
Increscitur in Personal Injury Cases 
Frank E. Mathews 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frank E. Mathews, Increscitur in Personal Injury Cases, 15 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 169 (1930). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss2/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
NOTES
WILLIAM G. HALE is Dean of the School of Law. He has been a
frequent contributor to the pages of the REVIEW. His article
on The Use by a Witness of His Prior Testimony for the
Purpose of Refreshing Recollection is one of several dealing
with the law of evidence. A previous article, The Missouri
Law Relative to the Use of Testimony Given at a Former
Trial, may be found in 14 ST. Louis L. REV. at page 375.
NORMAN BIERMAN is an alumnus of the School of Law in the
class of 1929 and a member of the St. Louis Bar. His article
on Codification of International Law-A Basis of World
Government was awarded the prize for the best thesis sub-
mitted by a member of the graduating class of the School
last year.
SAMUEL BRECKENRIDGE NOTE PRIZE AWARD
Joseph J. Chused's note on "Jurisdiction to Award Alimony in
Missouri Where Defendant Is Not Personally Served" has been
awarded the fifteen dollar prize as the best note in the first issue
of the current volume.
THE SCHOOL OF LAW
The Washington University School of Law has recently become
associated in the publication of THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, the
first number of which is dated January, 1930, and has just come
from the press. THE JOURNAL is edited by the Northwestern
University School of Law, the University of Southern California
School of Law, and the Washington University School of Law,
in conjunction with the Air Law Institute. The Institute is
located at Northwestern University, where a summer session
will be held during the coming season. Issues of THE JOURNAL
will be edited successively by the three schools. Mr. George B.
Logan, Lecturer on Insurance at Washington University School
of Law, is the School's representative on the editorial board and
will have charge of the issues which are edited by the school.
Mr. Logan is the author of a recent book, AIR LAW-MADE
PLAIN.
Notes
INCRESCITUR IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES
Courts in general have no power in personal injury cases to
increase the damages as an alternative to a new trial, when the
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award by the jury is clearly inadequate., They do, however,
possess the power to make a reduction of excessive damages a
condition of refusing a new trial.2 Remittitur and increscitur,8
however, appear subject to identical criticism and justified by
the same reason. If they are analogous powers possession by
the courts of one should necessarily involve the possession of the
other.
Remittitur, which is now well-established, tolerates an in-
vasion by the court of the province of the jury through a sub-
stitution of the opinion of the former for that of the latter.4 To
logically reconcile this doctrine with the right in both parties to
a jury trial, it is necessary to establish the power of the court to
review the decision of the jury upon the question of damages.
Damages in this type of case are unliquidated. They are com-
posed of elements which cannot be accurately measured. It is
difficult to find a theoretical justification for the court's review
of damages where they are purely a matter of opinion. A re-
view of identical cases in which a remittitur was ordered will
reveal discrepancy in the damages indicated as not excessive.
A further illustration that courts are no more capable in this re-
'Mercado v. Nelson (1925) 118 Kan. 302, 235 Pac. 123; Osterholm v.
Butte Electric Ry. Co. (1921) 60 Mont. 193, 199 Pac. 252; Fine v. Mayer
(1916) 159 N. Y. S. 691. Many states, Missouri included, have had no occa-
sion to adjudicate the question.
'Brashear v. Rogers Foundry & Mfg. Co. (Mo. A. 1928) 11 S. W. (2d)
1060; Crews v. Schumcke Hauling & Storage Co. (Mo. 1928) 8 S. W. (2d)
624; Lilly v. Kansas City Ry. Co. (Mo. A. 1919) 209 S. W. 969; Western
U. Teleg. Co. v. North (1912) 177 Ala. 319, 58 So. 299; Finkelstein v.
Chicago (1912) 168 Ill. App. 475; East Chicago v. Gilbert (Ind. App. 1915)
109 N. E. 404; Knowlton v. Des Moines Edison Light Co. (1902) 117 Iowa
451, 90 N. W. 818; Yard v. Gibbons (1915) 95 Kan. 802, 149 Pac. 422;
Hamilton v. Great Falls Street Ry. Co. (1895) 17 Mont. 334, 42 Pac. 860;
Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Parby (1902) 28 Tex. Civ.,App. 413, 67 S. W.
446; Pennsylvania Co. v. Sheeley (1915) 221 F. 901; St. Louis I. M. &
S. R. Co. v. Adams (1905) 74 Ark. 326, 86 S. W. 287, 109 Am. St. Rep. 85;
Gila Valley G. & N. R. Co. v. Hall (1910) 13 Ariz. 270, 112 Pac. 845. Heim-
lich v. Tabor (1905) 123 Wis. 565, 102 N. W. 10.
'Although the term increscitur has received little usage, its application
to the judicial increase of insufficient verdicts seems to be more appropriate
than the use made of the term remittitur to include not only a remission but
also an increase of a verdict.
'Watt v. Watt (1905) A. C. 115; Savannah F. & W. R. Co. v. Harper
(1883) 70 Ga. 119; See also Heimlich v. Tabor, above n. 2.
'Note (1905) 61 CENT. L. J. 286.
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spect than juries is furnished by Goetz v. Ambs6 which was be-
fore the appellate court twice because of alleged excessiveness of
damages. The jury at the second trial awarded larger damages
than those assessed at the first. The court affirmed the judg-
ment in that amount notwithstanding the earlier reversal. How-
ever well taken the above objection may be, courts generally have
the power to grant a new trial because of excessiveness of dam-
ages.7 This is true even though the jury has been free from
misconduct and uninfluenced by passion or prejudice.
Remittitur cannot, however, rest solely upon this power. Infurther support of this doctrine, it is contended that neither
party is in a position to complain. The plaintiff is precluded by
his consent, while the defendant is permitted to pay less than ajury has assessed.8 In so far as the defendant is concerned, this
proposition finds support, only if it be shown that the jury is in
fact assessing the damages, and that it is impossible, had a new
trial been granted, that the jury would have awarded smaller
damages than those remaining after remittitur. Statements by
the courts that damages after a remission are assessed by thejury are often made.9 It is absurd to declare an award of five
thousand dollars to have been made by a jury when ten thousand
had been fixed upon by it. It is also gubmitted that the amount
permitted to stand after remission is not the minimum amount
which any impartial jury might award and yet be adequate, but
that which is not excessive.1o The rights of the defendant are
clearly invaded. He is entitled to have a jury estimate the dam-
ages and if he is to remain unprejudiced, the amount he is com-
pelled to pay must be the minimum that any impartial jury
would assess without being in the opinion of the court in-
adequate.1
While the doctrine of remittitur remains unsupported by the
contentions advanced above, it finds its justification in ex-
* (1885) 22 Mo. 170.
'Burdict v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1894) 123 Mo. 221, 27 S. W. 453; Cook v.
Globe Printing Co. (1910) 227 Mo. 471, 127 S. W. 332; see cases n. 2 above.
" Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Min. Co. (1895) 158 U. S. 41; Colo-
rado City v. Liafe (1901) 28 Colo. 468, 65 Pac. 630; Arkansas Val. L. & C.
Co. v. Maim (1889) 130 U. S. 69; Gila Valley Ry. Co. v. Hall (1914) 232
U. S. 94; Pendleton Street R. Co. v. Ralimaum (1872) 22 Ohio St. 466;
International & G. U. R. Co. v. Wilkes (1887) 68 Tex. 617, 5 S. W. 491.
'International & G. U. R. Co, v. Wilkes, n. 7 above; Florida R. & Nav.
Co. v. Webster (1899) 25 Fla. 394, 5 So. 714; Young v. Cowden (1897) 98
Tenn. 577, 40 S. W. 1088.
See cases in n. 2 above, especially Heimlich v. Tabor.
" Heimlich v. Tabor, n. 2 above.
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pediency.12 In Rueping v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 13 it is said:
"That rule . . . has been evolved . . . as a most valuable means
of promptly and without delay terminating disputes between
parties to the end that, so far as due course of law will permit,
wrongs may be remedied or prevented without that financial
exhaustion which tends to make men surrender valuable rights
rather than to persist in efforts to secure them by legal means."
The presence of this practice in almost every state is a testi-
monial to its practical value. Its operation is, however, pro-
hibited in some states where the verdict is the result of passion
or prejudice.14 The courts are unable to designate a portion of
the award as free from this influence.-3 It has been held, and it
seems correctly so, that where there has been error in the in-
struction or improper evidence permitted to go to the jury upon
the question of damages, remittitur will cure the error. 6 If the
"
2In Chitty v. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (1902) "166 Mo. 423, 65 S. W.
959, it is said: "The cases which deny the power [of ordering a remittitur]
concede the right of this court to attain the same end by the indirect route
of setting aside judgments on the ground that they are on their face the
result of passion, prejudice or misconduct of the jury until finally some
jury is thus coerced into returning a verdict which this court does not think
excessive. As long as the power is conceded to set aside a verdict other-
wise proper, solely on the ground that it is excessive, it must be acknowl-
edged that the proper, expeditious and economical administration of the
law requires the error to be corrected in a direct way by remittitur instead
of the indirect way above pointed out. Experience has demonstrated not
only the propriety but the necessity lor reaching a just and speedy cor-
rection of an otherwise unobjectionable verdict."
(1915) 168 Wis. 284, 151 N. W. 795.
"Gila Valley G. & N. R. Co. v. Hall, n. 7 above; Tunnel Min. & Leasing
Co. v. Cooper (1911) 50 Colo. 390, 115 Pac. 901; Seaboard Air-Line R. Co.
v. Bishop (1908) 132 Ga. 71, 63 S. E. 1103. It has been held, however,
that even where the verdict is so excessive as to indicate prejudice or pas-
sion, the brror may be cured by r'emittitur so long as this influence is not
shown to have affected the decision of the jury upon the merits. Birming-
ham R. Light & P. Co. v. Comer (1914) 10 Ala. App. 261, 64 So. 533;
Kurpgeweit v. Kirly (1910) 88 Neb. 72, 129 N. W. 177; St. Louis I. M. &
S. R. Co. v. Brown (1911) 100 Ark. 107, 140 S. W. 279.
1In Gurley 1. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1891) 104 Mo. 211, 16 S. W. 11, it is said:
"We have no scales by which we can determine what portion is just and what
part is poisoned with prejudice and passion." And in Harper v. St. L. &
S. F. Ry. Co. (1914) 186 Mo. A. 296, 172 S. W. 55 it is stated: "It appears
that in Missouri the reason that, if it is apparent that the verdict is the
result of passion and prejudice, a new trial will be granted seems to be that
one cannot tell that the same influenced the jury in its decision of guilt."
'Brown v. John M. Darr & Sons Planing Mill Co. (Mo. A. 1920) 217
S. W. 332; Warren v. Curtis & Co. (Mo. A. 1921) 234 S. W. 1029; Best v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (Mo. A. 1927) 299 S. W. 118; King v. Mann
(1926) 315 Mo. 318, 286 S. W. 100. But see Perkin v. U. Ry. Co. of St.
Louis (Mo. A. 1922) 243 S. W. 224.
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court may indicate the excess where there are no guides surely
when these are present, remittitur should be allowed.
Increscitur has received very little discussion and its operation
is limited to a very few states.17 The idea is not a new one; the
English case of Belt v. Lawes,5 decided in 1884 where remit-
titur was allowed and where it was insisted that if such were
allowed, increscitur might also be used, states: "Suppose a case
in which a new trial should be moved for on behalf of the plain-
tiff on the ground that the amount of damages which the jury
had given was obviously unreasonably too small, I am far from
saying that the court would not have the power in favor of the
plaintiff and in his interest, to say that the damages are too
small, but if the defendant will agree to their being increased
to such a sum as may be stated a new trial shall be refused."
Increscitur like remittitur must rest upon the power of the court
to review the question of damages, consent by one party,
and result entirely unprejudicial to the rights of the other.
A few states have felt so adverse to a review by the court for
inadequacy of damages, that prohibitions to this effect have
been enacted by them.19 However, the courts of a majority
of the states possess this power.20 In increscitur the con-
sent is, of course, by the defendant, and he cannot complain.
The plaintiff, however, is, as the defendant was in the operation
of remittitur, prejudiced. He is forced to accept not the maxi-
mum any impartial jury would impose, but an amount which
would appear to the court as adequate.
Thus far the two doctrines appear entirely analogous. But
the contention that the amount remaining after remission was
11 Gaffney v. Tilingsworth (1917) 90 N. J. L. 490, 101 Atl. 243; Marsh v.
Minneapolis Brewing Co. (1904) 92 Minn. 182, 99 N. W. 630; Blume v.
Ronan (1918) 141 Minn. 234, 169 N. W. 701; Aultman v. Thompson (1884)
19 F. 490; see also Carr v. Minner (1866) 42 Ill. 179; Marsh v. Kendall
(1902) 64 Kan. 48, 68 Pac. 1070; Belts v. Bueter (1868) 1 Idaho 185. In
Louisiana where no jury guarantee is found such power is exercised by the
courts. Sherwood v. Tichel (La. App. 1929) 120 So. 107; Goodson v.
Schuster's Wholesale Produce Co. (La. App. 1929) 120 So. 689.
' (1884) 12 Q. B. Div. 356, overruled by Watt v. Watt, n. 3 above.
""A new trial shall not be granted on account of smallness of the dam-
ages in an action for injury to the person or reputation, nor in any other
action where the damages shall equal the actual pecuniary injury sus-
tained." Ind. Ann. Stat. (Burns, 1926) sec. 611; Ky. Code (Carroll, 1927)
sec. 341.
Ozen v. Spercer (Miss. 1928) 117 So. 117; Swartz v. Pyle (N. J. 1929)
144 At. 323; Tarr v. United Railroads of San Francisco (1922) 187 Cal.
505, 202 Pac. 161; Meyer v. Basta (1925) 102 Conn. 144, 128 Atl. 32; Mc-
Laughlin v. R. W. Fagan Peel Co. (1921) 121 Miss. 116, 87 So. 471; Miller
v. Barker Rose & Clinton Co. (App. Div. 1916) 158 N. Y. S. 865.
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in fact assessed by a jury, which can have no application to
increscitur, is said to distinguish the practices. 2 1 This would
be true if the contention had merit. The award after the opera-
tion of either is that of the court and not a jury.
If increscitur can be said to possess the same practical value in
expediting justice through a speedy determination of cases, the
analogy will be complete. It has been said that the tendency is
for juries to award excessive rather than inadequate damages.22
While this may be true numerous cases have been remanded
because of inadequate damages.21 Where inadequate damages
have been assessed, the value of an increscitur can hardly be
doubted.
It is contended that increscitur cannot operate or extend to
cases in which all of the evidence was not before the jury or
where erroneous instructions were given.24  The jury, it is
thought, had it been in possession of all the evidence or of the
correct instructions, might have found more for the plaintiff than
the court allowed by increscitur. This is an objection which
strikes at the very foundation of remittitur. It has been stated
above that in remittitur the defendant is injured because another
jury might have assessed smaller damages than those permitted
to stand by the court. If this objection does not invalidate re-
mittitur, why should it defeat the operation of increscitur? The
Wisconsin doctrine, however, is not susceptible to this criticism.
The defendant is given the alternative of paying the maximum
amount that any jury would assess without being excessive, or
a new trial. The plaintiff, should the defendant refuse to pay
such a sum, is given the alternative of accepting the minimum
amount any jury would assess without being inadequate, or a
new trial.25 While the proposition is not subject to theoretical
criticism, its operation is curtailed by the difficulty of gaining
the consent of either party. In Rueter v. Hickman, Breuner
I Burdict v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., n. 6 above.
'In Baker v. Madison (1885) 62 Wis. 137, 22 N. W. 141, it is said:
"Every lawyer and judge knows that the almost uniform tendency of suc-
cessive trials in such cases is in the direction of an increase of damages."
SSee cases n. 19 above.
Lary v. City of Detroit (1906) 145 Mich. 265, 108 N. W. 661.
Heimlich v. Tabor, n. 1 above; Gerlach v. Gruett (1921) 175 Wis. 354,
185 N. W. 195; Rueping v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co. (1904) 123 Wis. 319, 101
N. W. 710; Secard v. Rhinelander L. Co. (1914) 147 Wis. 614, 133 N. W.
45; Hana v. Chicago Ry. Co. (1914) 156 Wis. 626, 146 N. W. 878; Beach
v. Bird & Wells Lumber Co. (1908) 135 Wis. 550, 116 N. W. 245; Katz v.
Miller (1912) 148 Wis. 63, 133 N. W. 1091; West v. Bayfield Mill Co. (1912)
149 Wis. 145, 135 N. W. 478; Krawireki v. Kuckhefer Box Co. (1912) 151
Wis. 176, 138 N. W. 710; Poler v. Mitchell (1913) 152 Wis. 583, 140 N. W.
330.
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Co.,2 1 it is said: "Permitting a defendant to allow judgment
against him for a maximum amount is usually not a consum-
mation devoutly to be wished for by him." That the Wisconsin
courts are careful to employ its practice in proper cases is in-
dicated by the language found in Rueter v. Hickman, Breuner
Co. 2 7 "But aside from that in a case like this where there is
legitimately such a wide range in the amount of damages that
may be properly assessed depending upon how the proof im-
presses the jury and the court, it is deemed a better administra-
tion of justice to let another jury assess the damages."
Thus to adopt a logical and theoretically justifiable practice is
to decrease its utility through a limitation of its operation and
application. The objection, however, which the Wisconsin doc-
trine seeks to avoid is perhaps not as serious as it appears. A
second jury is not likely in case of increscitur to award larger
damages than the court has fixed upon or in case of remittitur,
smaller damages.
If the court possesses the power to order a remittitur there is
no logical objection to its ordering an increscitur. It has been
advanced by those judges of the Supreme Court of Missouri,
who were out of sympathy with the exercise of the doctrine of
remittitur, that to allow a remission of part of the verdict would
also obligate the courts to allow an increscitur.28 There can be
little doubt that on principle the court occupies the same position
as to both. Increscitur like remittitur is applicable or should be
applicable to all cases where the award is not the result of pas-
sion or prejudice which contaminates the whole verdict and
permeates the question of liability as well as damages, and where
the evidence supports the finding of liability.
FRANK E. MATHEWS, '30.
CONSANGUINEOUS MARRIAGES-A SCIENTIFIC
APPROACH
Consanguineous marriages have been a problem for the human
race as far back as the memory of man goes. Whether such
unions should be favored, merely tolerated, prohibited, or ac-
tually made criminal is a question which has puzzled the law-
makers of every generation. Today despite the fact that both
legal science and eugenics have advanced considerably, there is
still grave question as to the advisability of first-cousin mar-
riages especially, and to a lesser degree uncle-niece (or aunt-
nephew) unions. This is shown in the present legal status of
N. 12 above.
N. 12 above.
See dissenting opinions in Burdict v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., n. 6 above.
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